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INDIANA'S SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH ACT IN OPERATION
ANTHONYt AND SUSAN JAMART GRANUCCIt
Introduction
Persons who violate accepted standards of sexual conduct have
always been objects of societal concern. Accordingly, legislation designed
to curb sex offenders dates from the beginning of recorded history.1
One of man's more recent attempts to cope with this problem is the
Indiana Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Persons Act of 1949, as amended
in 1959.2 The act has received neither the judicial, nor the scholarly
scrutiny which it deserves. Since 1959, the Indiana Supreme Court has
spoken on the subject only twice, and only one student law review note
has dealt with the act's provisions.'
This article will describe the functioning of the sexual psychopath
act and, where necessary, the authors will present suggestions for im-
provement in this functioning. However, neither the constitutionality of
the Indiana scheme nor its value in preventing recidivism among sex
offenders will be considered. The former will have to be determined by
future developments in federal case law' and the latter cannot be
discerned without a follow-up study of those persons who have gone
through the rehabilitation process.5
The Statutory Scheme
The sexual psychopath act is a sub-system of criminal law.6 Chart
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tResearch Associate, Indiana University.
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1. Good, Capital Punishment and Its Alternatives in Ancient Near Eastern Law, 19
STAN. L. REv. 947, 956-61 (1967).
2. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3401 to 9-3410 (Burns 1956 Repl.), as amended (Burns
Supp. 1968). [Hereinafter referred to as the Sexual Psychopath Act].
3. See Wolfe v. State, -Ind.-, 219 N.E.2d 807 (1966); State ex rel. Haskett v.
Marion Criminal Court, -Ind.-, 234 N.E.2d 636 (1968); Note, Indiana's Sexual
Psychopath Statute, 44 IND. L.J. 242 (1969). One reason for this lack of attention has
been the mistaken belief that the statute is not used. See, e.g., P. GFBHARD, J. GAGNON,
W. PO MROY, C. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS 847 (1965).
4. See, e.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
5. The Department of Mental Health is usually not aware of the conduct of dis-
charged sexual psychopaths unless they are recommitted to its jurisdiction.
6. The authors do not express any view on the position taken by the Indiana
Supreme Court that the Sexual Psychopath Act is essentially civil in nature. State ex rel.
Haskett v. Marion Criminal Court, -Ind.-, 234 N.E.2d 636 (1968). In operation, sexual
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A is a schematic representation of that sub-system, illustrating the stages
of a sexual psychopathy proceeding and the various options available at
each stage. As noted at point five on the chart, a petition initiating a
sexual psychopathy proceeding cannot be filed until a criminal charge
has been lodged in a court of competent jurisdiction.7 The sub-system
cannot be activated, therefore, by either party until a crime has been
committed, an offender has been located and arrested, and the prosecuting
authorities have filed a formal criminal charge. (See chart A points
1, 2, 3, 4). The scope of the statute has been limited by judicial decision
from any criminal charge to criminal charges relating to sex offenses.'
In addition, charges of murder, manslaughter, or rape of a female child
under the age of twelve are excluded by the language of this statute.9 An
indefinite commitment to a state hospital under the sexual psychopath
statute acts as, and is therefore one path to, a final disposition of an
appropriate criminal charge.' °
In order to obtain a sexual psychopathy disposition of a criminal
charge, the defendant, or someone acting in the defendant's behalf, or
the prosecutor must file a petition for the examination of the defendant."
Unless such a petition is filed, the normal course of criminal proceedings
will follow. The filing of the petition initiates the procedures of the sexual
psychopath act; however, at any stage of those procedures a decision
can be made ending the process. In that event, the defendant is left to the
normal course of criminal proceedings for ultimate disposition.
A sexual psychopathy proceeding may be aborted by a withdrawal of
the petition for examination by the petitioning party, or the court may
deny the petition of either party on any of several grounds. 2 (See Chart
A at point 6). If the petition is granted, the court appoints two qualified
physicians who examine the defendant and file a written report with the
court.3 The power to end the proceeding then rests with each physician,
for if either physician reports that the defendant is not a criminal sexual
psychopath then the proceedings must end.'" (See chart A at point 7).
psychopathy proceedings occur only in courts with criminal jurisdiction, and only
when a criminal charge is pending.
7. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3403 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
8. State ex rel Savery v. Marion Criminal Court, 234 Ind. 632, 130 N.E.2d 128
(1955).
9. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3403 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
10. Id. § 9-3409.
11. Id. § 9-3403.
12. Student comment has made note of statutory language authorizing differential
treatment of petitions filed by the prosecutor and those filed by and on behalf of the
defendant. Note, Indiana's Sexual Psychopath Statute, 44 IND. L.J. 242, 248 (1969). It
appears that such differentiations are not made in practice. See text at note 73 inf a.
13. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
14. Id. See also 1949 OP. IND. Arr'y GEN. 13.
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If both physicians report that the defendant is a criminal sexual psycho-
path, a court hearing is held. If the judge finds, despite the physicians'
reports, that the defendant is not a probable sexual psychopath, the pro-
ceedings end. (See chart A at point 8).
The 1949 act provided for an indefinite commitment to the Division
(now the Department)'" of Mental Health if the judge found a defendant
to be a sexual psychopath following the reports of the two physicians."
In 1959 the act was amended to interpose two more stages prior to the
ordering of an indefinite commitment." Today, a finding of probable
sexual psychopathy by a trial court results in a limited commitment to the
Department of Mental Health, to last no more than sixty days from the
date of admission to the hospital. By the end of the sixty day period, the
Department of Mental Health must report its observations to the court.
Should the Department report that the defendant is not a sexual psycho-
path, the proceedings halt. 8 (See chart A at point 9). A positive finding
of sexual psychopathy by the Department of Mental Health does not bind
the court, however; and the defendant may still be found not to be a sexual
psychopath, in which case he is returned to court for further criminal
proceedings. (See chart A at point 10).
The abortion of a sexual psychopathy proceeding prior to an
indefinite commitment subjects the criminal defendant to regular criminal
proceedings such as he would face in jurisdictions without sexual psycho-
path acts or as he would face in Indiana if a petition had never been filed.
Such cases will normally be disposed of through dismissal, acquittal, or
conviction of the crime charged. (See chart A at point 16). Although
not adjudged a sexual psychopath, an individual may still find himself in
a state mental hospital receiving care and treatment similar to that
received by sexual psychopaths. Sometimes criminal charges are aborted
and the defendant is civilly committed to the Department of Mental
Health as mentally ill." (See chart A at point 13). Prior to trial on
criminal charges, a defendant may be found incapable of assisting in his
defense and be committed to the Department of Mental Health." (See
chart A at point 14). In addition, persons found not guilty of criminal
charges by reason of insanity are committed to the Department of Mental
Health2' (see chart A at point 15), and persons convicted and committed
to the Indiana Department of Corrections may find themselves in a state
15. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 22-5002, 22-5004 (Burns 1964 Repl.).
16. Ch. 124, § 4, 1949 Ind. Acts 328.
17. Ch. 356, § 1, 1959 Ind. Acts 955.
18. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(d) (Burns Supp. 1968).
19. Id. § 1201-1256 (Burns 1964 Repl.), as amended (Burns Supp. 1967).
20. Id. § 9-1706a (Bums 1956 Repl.), as amended (Burns Supp. 1967).
21. Id. § 9-1704a (Burns 1956 Repl.), as amnended (Burns Supp. 1967).
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mental hospital pursuant to an administrative transfer.22
A criminal defendant committed under the sexual psychopath statute
remains under the jurisdiction of the Department of Mental Health until
unconditionally discharged by the court which committed him. Under
statutory authority granted to the Commissioner of Mental Health, the
sexual psychopath is not necessarily confined to a state hospital for the
length of his commitment. Normally, he will be found on a parole status
which is subject to revocation by the Department of Mental Health.
(See chart A at point 11). A sexual psychopath, whether or not on
parole status, can petition the committing court for discharge at any
time after his commitment.2 4 If the court is shown that the sexual
psychopath has "fully and permanently recovered from his psychopathy,"
a discharge must be ordered.25 (See chart A at point 12).
History of the Sexual Psychopath Act 6
In 1949, Indiana became one of a small minority of states which had
created a special statutory scheme for the commitment of sex offenders.
Two factors converged in Indiana to lead to such a result. First, a
favorable judicial attitude towards such enactments existed immediately
after World War II, and second, the years 1947 to 1949 produced an
hysterical public demand for new solutions to the problem of sex offenders.
Prior to *World War II, the states of California, Illinois, Michigan,
and Minnesota had enacted schemes for the civil commitment and
psychiatric treatment of sexual psychopaths.2 By the end of 1947,
Massachusetts, Vermont, and Wisconsin had also enacted similar pro-
visions." Indiana lawmakers had, therefore, several examples of the
"modern" treatment of sex offenders in neighboring states. In addition,
the Michigan and Minnesota statutes had survived constitutional chal-
22. Id. § 13-1628 (Burns Supp. 1967).
23. Id. § 9-3407 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
24. Statutory language is ambiguous about who may file a discharge petition. It is
the position of the Department of Mental Health, however, that the Department is with-
out the authority to file a petition on behalf of a sexual psychopath. See IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-3408 (Burns 1956 Repl.). In practice, neither prosecuting attorneys nor the
Department of Mental Health initiate proceedings for discharge, thus this process is left
entirely to the committed individual. See text at notes 137-38 infra.
25. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-4308 (Burns 1956 Repl.). For comment on the statutory
standard of discharge see note 41 infra, at 465 and note 12 supra, at 259-60.
26. The following discussion relies in part on C. Wallin, A Study of the Indiana
Sexual Psychopath Law and of Twenty Sex Offenders Committed Under the Law from
March 7, 1949-March 7, 1950, 8-23 (1951) (unpublished Master's thesis in the
Indiana University Library).
27. CAL WELFARE AND INST. CODE §§ 5500 et seq. (West 1939) ; ILL. ANN. STAT.
c. 38, §§ 820.1 et seq. (1938); MIcn. STAT. ANN. § 28.967 (1939); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 526.09 et seq. (1939).
28. MASS. ANN. LAws, ch. 123A (1947) ; VT. REv. STAT. §§ 6699 et seq. (1947);
WIS. STAT. § 959.15 (1947).
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lenges in their states' highest courts, and the United States Supreme
Court had placed its imprimatur on the Minnesota scheme.29
While this favorable juridical atmosphere prevailed, Indiana also
became the scene of complicated litigation over the rape/murders of six
Indiana women. Four of the murders had occurred in the Fort Wayne
area during 1944 and 1945. They had dropped from the public mind by
June 1947 when Ralph W. Loubaugh walked into a police station and
confessed to three of the crimes."0 He pleaded guilty to these crimes on
October 27, 1947 and was sentenced to death. Previously another person
had been indicted for one of the three murders to which Loubaugh con-
fessed, but the prosecution was dropped.2' Subsequent to Loubaugh's
convictions, a third man, Robert V. Christen, was indicted for one of the
murders of which Loubaugh was convicted. Christen was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment, leaving two men convicted of the same
crime.32
Adding to the public confusion surrounding those complicated cases,
Robert A. Watts, a twenty-five year old Negro, was arrested on November
12, 1947 on a charge of attempted rape.33 Following several days of
intense questioning by Indianapolis police, Watts confessed to the
murders of two Indianapolis women. Watts' past history of sex offenses,
including several rape and peeping charges, were uncovered and publiciz-
29. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) ; People v.
Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.W.2d 18 (1942); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate
Court, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939). These decisions were relied upon by
proponents of the 1949 statute. See note 37, infra.
30. Brief for Appellee at 9, Loubaugh v. State, 226 Ind. 548, 82 N.E.2d 247 (1948).
31. Brief for Appellant at 187-88, Christen v. State, 228 Ind. 30, 89 N.E.2d 445
(1950).
32. The testimony of the previously indicted person was a key factor in the pro-
secutions of both Christen and Loubaugh, having at various times identified each as the
assailant in one of the murders. Christen's conviction was reversed by the Indiana
Supreme Court for insufficient evidence. Christen v. State, 228 Ind. 30, 89 N.E.2d 445
(1950). These cases were further complicated by the confession of Franklin Click to two
of the murders for which Loubaugh was convicted. Brief for Appellant at 34-39, Click
v. State, 228 Ind. 644, 94 N.E.2d 919 (1950). Click was convicted of one murder and
sentenced to death, despite evidence that his confessions, made while he was facing a life
sentence for kidnapping, were motivated by potential monetary gain. His conviction and
death sentence were affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court. Click v. State, 228 Ind. 644,
94 N.E.2d 919 (1950). The multiple confessions in these cases are similar to develop-
ments in the 1964 Wylie murders in New York City. Two persons confessed to the
murders, one was convicted, People v. Robles, 29 A.D.2d 751, 287 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1968),
and it appears that the actual murderer is currently at large in Europe. See J. BRUSSEL,
CASEBOOK OF A CRIME PSYCHIATRIST 106-35 (1968).
33. Watts was convicted of one murder and sentenced to die. His conviction was
affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court in Watts v. State, 226 Ind. 655, 82 N.E.2d 846
(1948). Watts appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the contention that his
confessions were involuntary. The Supreme Court reversed in Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49 (1949). Watts was retried, convicted, and sentenced to die. Watts v. State, 229
Ind. 80, 95 N.E.2d 570 (1950).
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ed, 4 and Indiana authorities initiated a reappraisal of the state's handling
of sex offenders.
Intense public pressure led to a conference involving law enforce-
ment and medical officials.3" The state's prosecuting attorneys also took
up the problem of sex offenders at their annual meeting." During this
period, Watts was convicted and sentenced to die, and legal maneuvers
in his behalf remained in the public view. A draft proposal, relying heavily
on the Michigan and Illinois experiences, was presented to the legislature
in January, 1949. Unexpected opposition to the draft forced the attorney
general's office to file a formal opinion on the constitutionality of the bill.
In the absence of significant appellate decisions, the attorney general's
opinion still remains the only definitive statement on the meaning of the
1949 act."
Two amendments to the bill were made in the House of Representa-
tives. The first required that one of the two "qualified examining
physicians" be a psychiatrist."5 Since only one medical examination was
required for an indefinite commitment under the 1949 act, this was clearly
intended as insurance that a valid medical opinion would be obtained. This
amendment was eliminated from the final act because of the lack of
psychiatrists in many areas of Indiana. The second amendment to the bill
was incorporated into the final act. This proposal limited the situations in
which proceedings under the sexual psychopath act would be available.
The amendment exempted any person charged with murder, man-
slaughter, or rape of a female child under the age of twelve. 9 This limita-
tion was specifically designed to prevent the act from becoming a haven
for the most serious offenders. The act, as amended, passed both houses
of the legislature and was signed by the governor on March 7, 1949." 0
By 1959, it had become apparent that the 1949 act, which relied for
its medical judgment solely on the opinions of two doctors, neither of
whom was required to be a psychiatrist, had resulted in the commitment
of many persons who did not fit the medical definition of a sexual
psychopath. In a 1957 article on the administration of the act, Elias
Cohen, Assistant to the Commissioner of Mental Health, concluded that
over twenty-three per cent of those persons committed did not meet the
34. The Indianapolis News, Nov. 14, 1947, I, at 1.
35. The Indianapolis News, Mar. 4, 1948, II, at 1, col. A.
36. The Indianapolis News, Mar. 19, 1948, II, at 15, col. A.
37. 1949 Op. I-XD. ATr'y GEN. 12.
38. 1949 IND. H.R. JOUR. 172.
39. Id. at 620, 621.
40. Id. at 1069, 1117.
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statutory standard. 1 In response to this problem the act was amended to
give the Commissioner of Mental Health review power in the com-
mitment process.2 A sixty day observation period was interposed between
the findings of the two examining physicians and the order for an
indefinite commitment. The amendment provided that further proceed-
ings could not take place if, at the end of the sixty day observation period,
the Department of Mental Health found the defendant not to be a sexual
psychopath.
Methodology
The only readily available information on the operation of the sexual
psychopath act is contained in a central file in the offices of the Indiana
Department of Mental Health. This information consists of a case file on
each person committed to the jurisdiction of the Department. Each file
contains pertinent court orders and proceedings and a complete medical
record. The amount of personal data in these files varies greatly.
On March 1, 1969, the date this study was completed, there were
637 case files. Cases 1 through 225 are indefinite commitments under the
1949 act made prior to the 1959 amendments; 1 through 160 were
analyzed in a 1957 study by Elias Cohen, Assistant to the Commissioner
of Mental Health;43 cases 161 through 225 are not included in the
present article because those commitments took place under the 1949
statutory scheme, and their value is now limited to a replication of
Mr. Cohen's results. The information which follows in this article was
taken from cases 226 through 621." Cases 622 through 637 were
observational commitments made after September 9, 1968. These were
excluded from this article because not enough time had elapsed to insure
that all proceedings had been completed and reported to the Com-
missioner's office.
Case files can only provide information on proceedings which result
in at least a sixty day commitment to the Department of Mental Health.
In order to understand proceedings which begin and end at the county
level, failing to reach at least the sixty day commitment, a questionnaire
was devised and mailed to each trial court judge and prosecuting attorney
41. Cohen, Administration of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Statute i Indiana,
32 IND. L.J. 450, 458 (1957). [Hereinafter cited as Cohen].
42. Ch. 356, 1959 Ind. Acts 955.
43. Cohen.
44. The total number of case files included is 397, covering the commitments of
396 individuals. Two hundred forty-eight individuals have been adjudged sexual
psychopaths, one person twice, for a total of 249 indefinte commitments. One hundred
forty-eight persons, committed for sixty day observations, were not adjudged as
sexual psychopaths.
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in the state. Fifty-two per cent of the prosecutors and fifty-seven per cent
of the judges replied." By comparing the replies of the prosecutors and
judges with the records of the Commissioner of Mental Health, we believe
that a valid picture of the operation of the act at the county level has been
obtained.
The Sexual Psychopath
WVho is the sexual psychopath that the Indiana statute seeks to
identify and detain? The answer is not at all certain. This imprecision has
led to allegations that statutes of its type are void because of vagueness.
Few people still contend that sexual psychopath defines a recognizable
medical category. 6 However, that does not mean that it cannot define a
recognizable and justifiable legal category. 7 In Indiana, a person may
be a sexual psychopath if he is suffering from a mental disorder [is
neurotic or character disordered], provided that he is over sixteen
years of age, not feebleminded, and not insane [psychotic]." An
individual is commitable if, in addition to the above, he possesses a
"propensity" to commit sex offenses.49 The basis for exclusion of both
the feebleminded and those suffering from psychotic disorders is that
they are subject to commitment under other statutes.5" The Indiana
classifications, which can be shown to have a basis in the American
Psychiatric Association's Standard Nomenclature, would meet any rea-
sonableness test they would face in court.51
Assuming a given number of persons within the population of
Indiana who fit the aforementioned statutory criteria, the vast majority of
such persons do not fall within the provisions of the present law. Those
sexual psychopaths who have yet to commit a sex offense, who have
committed a sex offense but have yet to be apprehended, and who are
apprehended and released without the filing of a formal criminal charge
45. The completed questionnaires and case records are on file in the Indiana
University School of Law Library in Bloomington, Indiana.
46. But see H. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY (1950) and note 51 infra.
47. Cf. Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3401 (Burns 1956 Repl.). The words in parenthesis show
the Department of Mental Health's interpretation of the statutory language. For a
justification of the Department's interpretation, see Cohen, at 457.
49. Id.
50. IND. ANN. STAT. § 22-1907 (Burns 1964 Repl.) and IND. ANN. STAT. §§
22-1201 to 22-1256 (Burns 1964 Repl.), as amended (Burns Supp. 1967).
51. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, STANDARD NOMENCLATURE (1952) re-
printed in part in J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS,
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 506-14 (1967). It is beyond the authors' competence to join the
debate over whether or not mental illness exists or whether character disorders are
mental illnesses. See the authorities cited in Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, On the
Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 80 n. 19 (1968).
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cannot be proceeded against.52
The authors do not wish to suggest that the provisions of this act
should extend to persons who have yet to be identified as perpetrators of
a sex offense. There are grave philosophical and practical barriers to such
an attempt. But to understand what the Indiana sexual psychopath
statute does, we must also realize what it does not do. It does not operate
until a sex offender has committed a crime and has been apprehended. It
does not, therefore, prevent sex offenses in the first instance. It may,
however, prevent recidivism by those persons who are subjected to the
treatment which the act offers. 3
A sexual psychopath statute, however, need not wait until an offense
has been committed. One can visualize a rational system designed to
detect and detain potential sex offenders. Such a system would be based
on a "prediction-prevention" model of law enforcement, rather than on
the "deterrent" model upon which our criminal law claims to rest.5" It
certainly seems that the social good is increased by the use of what
Blackstone called "preventive justice."5 Indeed Blackstone's concept of
preventive justice has found a home at many stages of our judicial
52. The figures given in the F.B.I.'s Uniform Crime Reports, 96-111, (1966)
indicate that of reported sex offenses approximately sixty per cent are cleared by arrest.
Only one half of those arrested are ever formally charged.
53. See text at notes 4-5 stepra.
54. The terminology is from A. Dershowitz, The Role of Law in the Prediction and
Prevention of Harmful Conduct (Paper delivered at the 43d Annual Meeting of the
American Orthopsychiatric Association, 1966), reprinted in part in J. KATz, J.
GOLDSTEIN & A..DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY & LAW 588 (1967). See
also Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: "A Knife That Cuts Both Ways,"
51 JUDICATuRE 370 (1968), and Frankel, Preventive Restraints and Jlust Conpensation:
Toward a Sanction Law of the F, ture, 78 YALE L.J. 229 (1968).
55. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *251:
OF THE MEANS OF PREVENTING OFFENCES
... And really it is an honour, and almost a singular one, to our English laws,
that they furnish a title of this sort; since preventive justice is, upon every
principle of reason, of humanity, and of sound policy, preferable iri all respects
to Punishing justice; the execution of which, though necessary, and in its
consequences a species of mercy to the commonwealth, is always attended with
many harsh and disagreeable consequences.
Lewis Carroll found a delightful way of voicing his agreement with Blackstone:
"[T]here's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished: and the trial
doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last of all."
"Suppose he never commits the crime?" said Alice.
"That would be all the better, wouldn't it?" the Queen said ....
Alice felt there was no denying that. "Of course it would be all the better," she said,
"but it wouldn't be all the better his being punished."
"You're wrong there, at any rate," said the Queen. "Were you ever punished?"
"Only for faults," said Alice.
"And you were all the better for it, I know! " the Queen said triumphantly.
"Yes, but then I had done the things I was punished for," said Alice," that makes all the
difference."
"But if you hadn't done them," the Queen said, "that would be better still; better, and
better, and better !" L. CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE 248 (1960).
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system. The quarantine of persons afflicted with contagious diseases,"
the detention of potential saboteurs, 7 the bail system,"s and civil com-
mitments of the mentally ill" are but a few examples.
All forms of preventive justice suffer from one critical defect-an
inability to know whom to prevent. Our inability to say, with accuracy,
who will or will not commit a future sex offense stems from the laws of
statistics. A large number of false positives (predictions of an event which
does not in fact occur) invariably results when one attempts to predict,
by clinical or statistical means, the occurrence of a rare event.6 " For-
tunately for society, the sex offense is a rare event. However, this rarity
forces us to wait until the event occurs and only then proceed to prevent
the individual from committing another such act.
Although the sexual psychopath statute does not operate unless a
crime has been committed, there is no requirement that the alleged sexual
psychopath be found guilty of committing that crime. While it is not likely
that the elimination of normal criminal protections results in the com-
mitment of "innocent" persons,6' the lack of a conviction requirement
has created two prosecutorial practices.62 First, prosecutors can proceed
against a defendant under the sexual psychopath statute even though
they do not have sufficient evidence for a criminal conviction. This can
occur either when there is a lack of evidence of guilt or when evidence
of guilt is present, but inadmissible at a criminal trial. Second, prosecutors
may threaten misdemeanor defendants with a sexual psychopathy pro-
ceeding in order to secure a guilty plea.
While neither practice is illegal, both have a potential for abuse.
The requirement of finding guilt 3 prior to the institution of sexual
56. The fate of (Typhoid) Mary Mallon, who was incarcerated for twenty-six
years for being a typhoid carrier, is an example. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1938, at 17, col. 7.
57. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). See Rostow, The
Japanese Anerican Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). For a contemporary
example see 50 U.S.C. §§ 811, 813 (1964) which provide a manner by which to detain
security risks. See C. ALLEN, CONCENTRATION CAMPS U.S.A. (1966).
58. Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1489 (1966).
59. See authorities cited note 54 supra.
60. An example of the overprediction phenomenon can be found in Livermore,
Malmquist, & Meehl, supra note 51, at 84-85. For more on the problems of prediction
see P. MEEHL, CLINICAL V. STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954).
61. The authors noted several cases in which the Department of Mental Health
recommended that a defendant be allowed to stand trial because of (possible) innocence.
The facts of one case, in which a man was committed for indecent exposure by his adult
sister because he walked around the family home in his underwear, strongly suggested
an abuse of the statutory provisions (Case 263).
62. These practices were brought to the authors' attention by one prosecutor and
one judge (formerly a prosecutor) who had engaged in them.
63. This finding need not be a formal criminal conviction. One of the reasons for
not requiring a conviction was the desire not to stigmatize a mentally ill offender with a
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psychopathy proceedings would eliminate both practices. Then, the ex-
amining physicians would be justified in the presumption of guilt they
indulge in when forming their diagnosis."'
Bringing the Sexual Psychopath Act into Play
A petition requesting examination of the defendant must be filed with
the court in order to initiate proceedings under the sexual psychopath
statute. By studying petitions one learns which parties bring the act into
play, thereby giving an impression of how the act is viewed by persons
dealing with it. The authors expected that this act, which provides for an
indefinite civil commitment, would have been utilized almost exclusively
by prosecuting authorities. It was thought that defendants would view the
act as potentially oppressive because of their concern about the adequacy
of state hospital facilities and the fear of being forgotten in a mental
hospital. The files of the Department of Mental Health, however, show
that one-quarter to one-half of all sexual psychopath proceedings are
initiated by the defendant or someone in his behalf.65 Of 397 cases
reviewed, 30.7 per cent were filed by the prosecutor, twenty-one per cent
were filed by the defendant or someone in his behalf, and forty-eight per
cent of the cases did not indicate who had filed the petition.6" Assuming
constant proportions throughout the unknown group, a figure of forty
per cent is computed for cases filed by defendants.
This percentage was confirmed by the questionnaires. Sixteen of
forty-four judges reporting sexual psychopathy proceedings in their courts
stated that fifty per cent or more of the petitions filed in their courts were
filed by the defendant. There were major differences between counties.
Lake County, for example, reported that approximately three-quarters of
criminal conviction. Interview with Cleon Foust, Dean, Indiana University School of Law
at Indianapolis, and formerly Attorney General of Indiana, Apr. 1, 1969. One might ask,
however, who suffers from the greatest stigma, an ex-convict or an ex-criminal sexual
psychopath? A formal criminal conviction would carry with it, of course, certain civil
disabilities. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-4804 (Burns 1969 Repl.) disenfranchising
persons convicted of crime during the period of their imprisonment.
64. Many judges and prosecutors instruct the examining physicians to presume
the defendant's guilt. It also has been established that clinicians have a negative attitude
toward known sexual offenders. Berman & Freedman, Clinical Perception of Sexual
Deviates, 52 J. OF PSYCHOLOGY 157-60 (1961).
65. Petitions filed "on behalf of the defendant" numbered only eleven. These in-
cluded petitions from wives, mothers, and attorneys. While it is possible that some of
these were filed against the defendant's personal wishes, the number is too small to
affect the conclusions stated in the text.
66. The Department of Mental Health does not require that committing courts send
it a copy of the petition, although they do request all other pertinent information. Ind.
Dep't of Mental Health, Codified Official Bulletins V-5.04.D(Nov. 20, 1967). [Herein-
after cited as Official Bulletins]. Only a few courts send copies of the petitions;
nevertheless, the identity of the petitioner can sometimes be obtained from the wording
of court orders.
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the petitions filed were initiated by the defendant." Because Lake County
accounts for one-quarter of all sexual psychopath commitments, this
figure has had a marked effect on the totals. Marion County, however,
reported that approximately ninety-five per cent of their cases were filed
by the prosecutor.6"
The figures indicate that many defendants view the act as a beneficial
alternative to a criminal prosecution. This impression is confirmed by a
study of the criminal charges brought against defendants who initiated
sexual psychopathy proceedings. It was expected that these cases would
show exclusively charges of serious felonies; however, of the seventy-nine
charges that could be accurately attributed to defendants who had initiated
sexual psychopathy proceedings, only twenty-four were of felonies carry-
ing minimum sentences of two years or more.6" The remaining fifty-five
charges were, in the majority, potential misdemeanors, and only one
carried a minimum sentence of over one year.7' This large number of
minor offenses indicates that defendants are willing to use the statute
even if they would only face light criminal punishments.
Disposition of Petitions Prior to the Appointment of Examiniig
Physicians
Disposition of a petition for examination by either withdrawal or
dismissal is a rare event, occurring in less than four per cent of the cases.
Several factors account for this: first, the statute seems to require that a
petition from the prosecutor be entertained ;71 second, the formal require-
ments for a petition are not stringent ;72 and, third, the vast majority of
67. Questionnaire received from the Hon. John J. McKenna, Judge, Lake Criminal
Court. The files indicate that the higher proportion of petitions filed by defendants may
be due to policies of the Lake County Public Defender.
68. Questionnaire received from the Hon. Saul B. Rabb, Judge, Marion Criminal
Court.
69. These included six charges of first degree burglary, minimum sentence ten
years, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-701 (Burns 1956 Repl.); seventeen charges of rape and
statutory rape, minimum sentence two years, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4201 (Burns 1956
Repl); and one charge of kidnapping, minimum sentence life imprisonment, IND. ANN.
STAT. § 10-2901 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
70. These include twenty-three charges of assault and battery, which may be either
a misdemeanor or a felony with a minimum sentence of one year, IND. ANN. STAT. §
10-403 (Burns 1956 Repl.) ; five charges of incest which may be either a misdemeanor or
a felony with a minimum sentence of two years, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4206 (Burns 1956
Repl.) ; two charges of indecent exposure, a misdemeanor, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2801
(Bums 1956 Repl.) ; and twenty charges of sodomy which may be either a misdemeanor
or a felony with a minimum sentence of two years, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4221 (Burns
1956 Repl).
71. One judge replied to the questionnaire that it was "impossible" to deny the
petition of a prosecutor. This position is unsound since it is axiomatic that the petition
must at least allege a criminal offense within the provisions of the statute.
72. The statute merely requires that the petition be "a statement in writing setting
forth facts tending to show" that the defendant is a criminal sexual psychopath. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-3403 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
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prosecuting attorneys indicated that they do not oppose petitions filed by
or for the defendant."
It appears that the grounds for dismissal of petitions are almost al-
ways statutory. The crime is either not a sex related offense or it is a
murder, manslaughter, or rape of a female child under the age of twelve.
That such petitions are filed is a confession of ignorance by members of
the bar. The statutory limitations are explicit, and the judicially imposed
limitation is annotated in the Burns 1956 Replacement.'
Examining Physicians
It was noted earlier that an attempt to amend the 1949 bill to
provide that one of the two qualified examining physicians be a psychiat-
rist had failed. In practice, however, it appears that in two-thirds of all
cases one, if not both, of the examining physicians have specialized
training in psychiatry.7 5 This is always true in Lake and Marion Counties,
which account for forty-seven per cent of all commitments. In addition,
over half of all other reporting jurisdictions follow a similar procedure.
The lack of physicians with training in psychiatry in rural portions of the
state is still so acute that several replies to the questionnaire cited a lack
of trained individuals as the reason for not utilizing psychiatrists."6
Following a personal examination of the defendant, the statute
requires the physicians to file in court "a written report of the results of
their examination, together with their conclusions." 7 The reports provide
evidence to be considered at the hearing, and they are available to all
concerned parties. In addition, copies of these reports are filed with the
Department of Mental Health if a sixty day observational commitment
is ordered. Several files did not contain written medical reports. Indica-
tions are that the examinations took place at the courthouse on the day
set for hearing and that the doctors presented their findings orally at the
hearing. Such practices are clearly in violation of statutory require-
ments.7 '
It was expected that virtually all examining physicians would find the
73. The opinion that the defendant should be allowed his "day in court" on the issue
of sexual psychopathy was a typical reply to the questionnaire.
74. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3403 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
75. It is impossible to distinguish from the available records what percentage of
"psychiatrists" are so certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology.
76. Several judges inquired why the State of Indiana could not provide psychiatric
assistance to rural counties. Such assistance could be necessary in any legal proceeding
involving a determination of mental illness. The authors feel it appropriate to restate
this inquiry.
77. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404 a (Burns Supp. 1967).
78. Official Bulletins, V-5.04.D.
79. Additional types of statutory violations in the commitment process will be
discussed in the text at notes 139-46 infra.
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defendant to be a sexual psychopath and recommend further observation.
However, it appears that a large number of petitions are disposed of when
either or both of the examining physicians report a negative conclusion.
Because such cases are not found in the files of the Department of
Mental Health, ° their total number is unclear. The returned question-
naires indicate that such dispositions occur in from one-fifth to one-
quarter of all cases.
The remaining examination reports are found in the files of the
Department of Mental Health. Their quality is quite poor. The authors
are unable to judge the medical validity of these reports. However, it is
apparent that the reports do not provide the court or attorneys with the
types of information and conclusions which lead to a meaningful hearing
and findings of fact subject to a meaningful review. The reports are
brief and fail to support their conclusions.8 ' Many examples were found
of one sentence reports reading "it is my professional opinion that the
defendant is a criminal sexual psychopath." 2 The lack of legally adequate
medical reports is particularly appalling in view of additional data which
suggests that judges and lawyers are relying inordinately on the ex-
amining physicians' opinions."s
Blame for the poor quality of examining physicians' reports cannot
rest solely with the medical profession. If judges, prosecuting attorneys,
and defense attorneys wish to have medical judgments prepared in a
manner appropriate for a legal setting,"4 they must make their require-
ments clear to the examining physicians.8" The questionnaires indicate,
however, that the vast majority of judges and prosecuting attorneys make
little or no effort to explain to the examining physician what he is
expected to discover and in what form it should be presented. Only
twenty-three per cent of the judges reported giving instructions to the
physicians, and most of these were limited to simply providing the
physician with a copy of the act containing the legal definition of a sexual
psychopath.
80. The Department files contain only cases in which the defendant has at least
been committed for a sixty day observational period.
81. The authors wish to acknowledge several remarkable exceptions to this rule
from two or three physicians who file reports of consistently high quality.
82. For two examples of reports which were filed prior to 1956 see Cohen, at 460-61.
83. See text at note 92 infira.
84. Reports should present the ascertainable facts from both the defendant's
social history and psychological test results, the facts which have not been ascertained,
and the doctor's diagnosis and the factors upon which it is based. Without. such reports,
attorneys cannot judge the validity of the doctor's conclusions and judges cannot make
findings of fact that are sufficient to provide a meaningful review by higher courts.
85. The difficulties of adapting psychiatric information to a judicial setting are
great, and practice shows that lawyers and judges often defer to testimony which sounds
scientific. See Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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This failure of the legal profession explains the findings of Cohen,
confirmed by our results, that large numbers of doctors' reports address
themselves to questions other than whether the defendant is a sexual
psychopath.86 Often reports discuss whether a defendant is competent to
stand trial, needs treatment, and was responsible for his actions. While
such findings would be relevant in certain legal proceedings, they are not
relevant in the context of a sexual psychopathy proceeding.17 Physicians
who know what is expected of them would not submit such irrelevant
reports. A substantial improvement in this situation could be effected by
the education of the bar.88 Improved medical reports may avoid un-
86. Cohen, at 460.
87. For example, competency hearings, IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706a (Burns 1956
Repl.), as amended (Burns 1967 Supp.) ; commitments of the mentally ill, IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 22-1201 to 22-1256 (Burns 1964 Repl.), as amended (Burns 1967 Supp.);
or criminal trials in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity has been entered,
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-1701 to 9-1703 (Burns 1956 Repl).
88. It is hoped that representatives of Indiana's trial judges and prosecuting
attorneys will prevail upon the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Mental Health
to prepare information for attorneys involved in these cases and to prepare sample
instructions and report forms to be supplied to examining physicians. One circuit court,
in an attempt to standardize examining physicians' reports, has merely codified their
worst features. The form reproduced below calls for conclusions but only provides a
minimum of space for the justifications of the conclusions. The form does not inquire
about, and apparently the court does not expect, any psychological testing to which
the defendant may have been subjected.
STATE OF INDIANA IN THE HUNTINGTON CIRCUIT COURT
SS:
COUNTY OF HUNTINGTON
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, FOR THE
EXAMINATION OF CAUSE NO.
AN ALLEGED CRIMINAL SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHIC
PERSON.
STATEMENT OF MEDICAL EXAMINER
I ....................................... , M.D., of the City of Huntington, County
of Huntington, State of Indiana, do hereby certify that I am duly licensed to practice
medicine in Indiana; that I am not related, by consanguinity or marriage to ..........
................................. who is alleged to be a criminal sexual psychopath
and whom I have carefully and separately examined this ........ day of ............ ,
19 ........ ; that I am of the opinion that he (is) (is not) a criminal sexual psychopath
and (is) (is not) a proper person for detention in a Division of Mental Health, (and)
(not) to be confined by the Department of Mental Health of the State of Indiana in
an appropriate psychiatric institution for an indeterminate period for the purpose of
observation, evaluation and diagnosis of such person by the psychiatric staff of such
institution; and that I have formed my opinion that he (is) (is not) a criminal sexual
psychopathic person from the following facts observed by me. (Describe physical and
mental conditions; appearance and behavior of patient.)
[space]
I have also received the following information from others relative to the alleged
criminal sexual psychopathic person's condition:
[space]
The following is a brief statement of the medical history of ......................
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necessary observational commitments and may make the remaining obser-
vations more meaningful by providing the Department of Mental Health
with the benefit of an additional opinion.
The Initial Hearing
After two examining physicians find a defendant a sexual psychopath,
the court holds a hearing to determine for itself whether the defendant is
"probably a criminal sexual psychopath." 9 This initial hearing" has
been analogized to a criminal "probable cause" hearing, and all procedural
protections of a full and fair hearing apply.91
An important question raised by our investigations is: Do procedural
protections have any effect on the outcome of the hearing? As noted
previously, judges and lawyers defer inordinately to the doctors' reports.
The conclusions of the two examining physicians are never over-
ruled by the judge.9" In every case in which the examining physicians
concluded that the defendant was a sexual psychopath, and in several
cases in which they did not, 3 the defendant was committed to the hospital
for a sixty day observation. Two interpretations of these facts are possible.
First, each decision may be substantively correct. If this is the case, then
procedural safeguards serve simply as deterrents to the filing of unmerit-
which information I received from the said ............................ and others:
[space]
M.D.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this .......... day of .............., 19 .......
CLERK, HUNTINGTON CIRCUIT COURT
89. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(d) (Burns Supp. 1968).
90. The statute does not require, nor does there appear to be, a hearing on whether
the petition should be granted.
91. Note, Indiana's Sexual Psychopath Statute, 44 IND. L.J. 242, 256-68 (1969).
Although statutory language does not explicitly require all due process safeguards, it
appears that the majority of hearings are conducted within Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S.
605 (1967), standards. The authors did nor discover any case files showing evident
failure of process; however, due to a lack of court records in many files, this cannot be
taken as conclusive. See 44 IND. L.J. at 242, 243 for the history of the Haskett case, in
which an initial sexual psychopath hearing was vacated because of lack of counsel.
Any procedural defects in commitments are cognizable on a motion for a belated
new trial, INDIANA SUPREME COURT R. § 2-40. It is doubtful, however, if any of the
dispositions would be altered upon retrial. Haskett, whose commitment was voided on
July 20, 1967, was ordered for re-examination on the same day.
92. Of seventy-seven judges replying to the survey, forty-three had utilized the
statute at some time during the past ten years. None of the forty-three reported such an
occurrence. But see Wilson v. State, 236 Ind./278, 139 N.E.2d 554 (1957). One prosecutor
reported a case in which a petition had been granted, the doctors had reported that the
defendant was a sexual psychopath, but the judge did not commit the defendant for an
observation because the crime charged was not sex-related. This cannot be considered a
case of a judge overruling the doctors, but rather a case of a legal defect which was
not caught when the petition was filed.
93. For a discussion of these and other instances of failure to comply with statutory
provisions, see text at notes 139-46 infra.
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orious cases and as desirable forms of judicial ritual. The second possi-
bility, as the proponents of due process in the area of civil commitment
contend, is that erroneous substantive decisions are being made in
the absence of such protections.
However, even in the presence of such protections erroneous deci-
sions are being made."4 The bar's inability to obtain adequate medical
reports and its reluctance to actively utilize such protections as the right
of cross examination" have resulted in the neutralization of these protec-
tions.
94. See note 92 supra and text at note 103 infra.
95. The first excerpt is from the Transcript of State of Indiana v. -, Cause
No. 33272, Lake Criminal Court, June 26, 1961, 5-7.
(Prosecuting Attorney)
Q. Tell the Court your name.
A. -.
Q. What is your business or profession?
A. Doctor of Medicine.
Q. You Practice in Crown Point?
A. In Crown Point, Indiana.
Q. How long have you practiced medicine, Doctor?
A. Ten years.
Q. During that time have you had occasion to specialize in any degree in the treat-
ment of mental diseases or treating mental patients?
A. Yes.
Q. You have been practicing in that field?
A. Yes.
(Defense Attorney)
I will stipulate to the Doctor's qualifications.
(Prosecuting Attorney)
Q. Have you had occasion to examine the defendant, - ?
A. Yes.
Q. When did this examination take place?
A. .. . I don't know the exact date, last Thursday, in the Lake County Jail.
Q. What did this examination consist of, Doctor?
A. A review of his case, a discussion with the defendant as to what he had done, a
discussion whether he realized this was something illegal and immoral and questions
leading him to realize this is something we should not do and questioning him further
if he had any previous history as to this type of thing.
Q. Did you ascertain he had a previous history of this type of thing?
A. He admitted to previous charges but he didn't admit to charges of the same type.
Q. Based on your examination and your experience do you have an opinion as to
whether or not the defendant, -, is a criminal sexual psychopath as set forth in the
Indiana statutes, are you familiar with the definition?
A. I have the code in my pocket right now, yes he would be classified, under the
Indiana statute as a criminal sexual psychopathic person.
Q. You say he is a criminal sexual psychopathic person?
A. Yes.
(Defense Attorney)
Q. Is it true as a result of your examination, you found out the defendant, when he
is drinking, has propensities to commit sexual misbehavior?
A. I did not cover that particular point in examining him, however, generally
speaking, this would be true, but I had not discussed this with -.
Q. You found further, pursuant to our statute, he is not feebleminded?




The 1959 amendments to the sexual psychopath act interposed an
observational commitment between an initial finding of probable sexual
psychopathy and the final adjudication of an indefinite commitment to
the Department of Mental Health. These additional procedures have
added an average of over three months to the commitment process. Table
1 indicates that the average elapsed time from the date of an observation
order to an order adjudging a person a sexual psychopath is 98.2 days.
Such testimony in sex deviant commitments is not atypical. The following is from
the transcript of a hearing under the Massachusetts Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,
MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 123A (1947):
(Prosecuting Attorney)
Q. What is your name?
A. Dr. -.
Q. And are you associated with the Bridgewater Treatment Center?
A. I am a consultant with the Division of Legal Medicine, Department of Mental




Mr. -has agreed to Dr. - qualifications.
THE COURT:
All Right.
Q. Did you have occasion to examine Mr. -, the petitioner who is before the
court this day?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when was the last time you examined him, sir?
A. I examined him on his recent observation period. . . I have, of course, seen
him in 1961 and 1962 also.
Q. And where did this examination take place?
A. Bridgewater Sex Treatment Center.
Q. And following the further examination, did you have discussions with other
members of your profession at the Bridgewater Sex Treatment Center with reference to
Mr. -?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you form an opinion based upon your discussion with Mr. -as well as your
discussion with the attending psychiatrists?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And what is that opinion, sir?
A. My opinion is that he remains at this time a sexually dangerous person within
the meaning of the law.
Q. And what is that opinion based upon?
A. It's based upon the interviews I had with him, the discussions of his current
condition, as well as a history of his past offences and his past mental and emotional
condition, as well as recent observations by other staff members in staff discussions,
psychologists, and so on.
(Prosecuting Attorney)
I have no further questions, thank you very much.
(Defense Attorney) :
I have no questions.
Transcript, Commonwealth v. -, Middlesex Superior Court No. 63107, 1517 (June 1,
1967).
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In order to isolate potential delay, Table 1 breaks down this figure into
three constituent parts: observation order to hospital admission, hospital
admission to the filing of an observation report, and the filing of an
observation report to an adjudication of sexual psychopathy. The first
two columns are based on those cases, out of a total of 397, in which this
information was available. Because the files of the Department of Mental
Health do not record the date of the second court hearing unless that
hearing resulted in a determination of sexual psychopathy, column three
is based on the average days in 241 out of 249 cases in which sexual
psychopathy was adjudicated.
Table 1
TIME FROM OBSERVATION ORDER TO
ADJUDGED SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH ORDER
Filing of Observation
Hospital Admission Report to Adjudged
Observation Order to to Filing of Sexual Psychopath
Year Hospital Admission Observation Report Order
Average Average Average
Days Cases Days Cases Days Cases
1959 13.4 12 40.7 13 43.9 9
1960 22.4 35 44.7 35 77.8 17
1961 14.9 43 47.5 42 35.7 26
1962 18.6 51 48.6 51 25.3 32
1963 22.4 40 49.25 40 23.5 25
1964 21.9 41 51.7 42 16.3 28
1965 16.8 53 41.6 53 20.6 37
1966 17.3 45 - 53.9 44 33.1 35
1967 16.3 35 75.1 34 23.0 22
1968 15.0 21 61.9 21 14.8 10
TOTAL 18.2 376 50.6 375 29.4 241
Column 1 indicates that an average of eighteen days elapsed from
the observation order to admission to the appropriate state hospital.
Whether or not he is ultimately found to be a sexual psychopath, this
time represents a total loss to the defendant because the statutory sixty
day period for observation runs from the date of admission to the
hospital."' The administrative procedures of the Department of Mental
Health require that the court send to the geographically appropriate state
hospital duplicate copies of several papers including the order of com-
mitment."' The hospital then must issue a "confinement authority" for
96. INI?. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(d) (Burns Supp. 1967).
97. Official Bulletins, V-5.04.D 1.
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the internal records of the Department of Mental Health98 and send two
copies of the authority to the committing court and one copy of the
authority and the court order to the central office of the Department of
Mental Health." The hospital designated in the "confinement authority"
to receive the defendant then awaits a contact from the court to arrange
for an admission day suitable to both the hospital and the local
authorities.' °
The function of the sixty day observation is to allow the staff of a
district state hospital to diagnose the defendant. While some therapeutic
value may result from these first two months, the Department of Mental
Health views this period as designed solely to "[a]dmit, confine,
observe, evaluate and diagnose the accused."'' This can be contrasted
with the Department's view of its role towards adjudged sexual psycho-
paths which is to "[a]dmit, care for, and treat the patient.' 0 2 It is to the
defendant's advantage to have the diagnosis completed in as short a period
of time as is medically feasible. If a person is not found to be a sexual
psychopath, he will be returned to court and his criminal charges disposed
of. For those ultimately adjudged sexual psychopaths, an earlier attain-
ment of that status means earlier treatment and earlier eligibility for
parole.
Column 2 of Table 1 shows that an average of 50.6 days elapsed
between the defendant's admission into the hospital and the filing of an
observational report with the court. The table indicates an upward trend
over the last ten years: in 1959 the average time spent in the hospital
98. Id., V-5.04.D 2. A copy of the 'confinement authority' is reproduced below.
STATE OF INDIANA
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
CONFINEMENT FOR OBSERVATION OF CSP
Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 124 of the Acts of 1949, as amended by Chapter
356 of the Acts of 1959, and in view of the finding and order of the ....................
Court, signed by the Honorable .................................... Judge, and dated
...................... finding that .................... is a probable criminal sexual
psychopath, and committing said person to the Department of Mental Health for the
purpose of observation, evaluation and diagnosis, the Commissioner of Mental Health
hereby directs that the said .......................................... be confined
in .......................................... for an indeterminate period of not to
exceed sixty days, for the purpose of observation, evaluation and diagnosis of said person
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was 40.7 days, yet by 1967 this figure had reached an average of 75.1
days on a sixty day commitment. Indeed, the averages for the years 1967
and 1968 both exceed the statutory period.
This upward trend stems from administrative rather than medical
necessity. Table 2 shows that this average period varies greatly among
the six state hospitals currently receiving sexual psychopaths. Two of the
hospitals produce observation reports in less than twenty-five days.
Logansport State Hospital, which is the second busiest in volume and
always produces a legally adequate report, requires an average of only
38.3 days. The Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital, however, which
receives the bulk of sexual psychopaths, takes an average of 62.8 days to
file a report, 2.8 days over the statutory period.
Table 3 shows a ten year trend within Norman M. Beatty Memorial
Hospital. The length of time has been steadily increasing from a low in
1959 of 37.75 days to a high of 97.81 days in 1967, which is more than
one month over the statutory period. The experiences of Madison State
Hospital, Richmond State Hospital, Logansport State Hospital,
Table 2
ELAPSED TIME FROM HOSPITAL ADMISSION TO
FILING OF OBSERVATION REPORT
Average
Hospital Days Cases
Norman M. Beatty 62.8 200
Logansport State 38.3 51
Central State 53.3 48
Richmond State 19.7 35
Evansville, State 24.9 30
Madison State 41.6 11
TOTAL 50.6 375
Table 3
ELAPSED TIME FROM HOSPITAL ADMISSION TO
FILING OF OBSERVATION REPORT















and of Norman M. Beatty Memorial Hospital during the year 1959
indicate that a medically complete report can be prepared within one
month from admission. The statutory provision of sixty days is twice
as long as is medically required and it is obvious that, in accordance with
Parkinson's Law, the length of time required to complete these reports
has grown to meet the allowable limit.
The whole system could be improved if some of the waste time were
eliminated. The authors recognize that changes in statutory language
cannot substitute for increased facilities and better distribution of cases
among hospitals; however, we do recommend that the statute be amended
to shorten the statutory observation period and to make that shortened
period run from the date of the observation order. These changes would
produce institutional pressures to lower the figures seen in the first two
columns of Table 1. Without such pressure, it is unlikely that the current
trends will be reversed.
Observation Reports
In his study of commitments under the 1949 act, Elias Cohen
found that thirty-seven out of 160 cases (twenty-three per cent) did not
meet the statutory criteria for commitment, because the defendants were
insane, feebleminded, or suffering from no mental disease.' The purpose
of the 1959 amendments was to eliminate such cases from the commitment
process. The value of the amendments has been proven. One hundred and
forty-eight persons who could, under the 1949 act, have been adjudged
sexual psychopaths, have not been so adjudged since 1959 either because
the hospital found that they were not sexual psychopaths or, even if
legally commitable, recommended another disposition. This figure, thirty-
seven per cent of all cases, indicates that those portions of the commitment
process which take place at the county level have not become more
accurate since Cohen's study, despite an increase in experience with the
act and despite a growing tendency to use examining physicians trained
in psychiatry. Two observations emerge from this condition.
First, there has perhaps been a lessening of stringency at the local level
since the 1959 amendments give the district state hospital the last say.
Second, it might confirm the impression that the legal profession is failing
at the local level to obtain correct diagnoses, despite the availability of
psychiatrists. In any event, the 1959 amendments are operating to prevent
unnecessary and inappropriate commitments.
The Second Hearing
The first question about the second hearing at which a probable
103. See Cohen, at 458.
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sexual psychopath is adjudged or not adjudged a sexual psychopath is:
Does that hearing ever occur? The statute does not explicitly require a
second hearing. It states that following an observational report which
concludes that the defendant is a sexual psychopath, "the court shall then
determine the question of the psychopathy of the accused person ... ."",
It is clear that, despite a reported statement from the Department of
Mental Health that a defendant is returned to court for a second hear-
ing,"0 5 this does not always take place. Indeed, the Department's Official
Bulletin recognizes that some courts do not hold second hearings:
N.B. Some courts may determine that the probable criminal
sexual psychopath (CSP-Observation) is an adjudged criminal
sexual psychopath (CSP-Adjudged) without having the ac-
cused return to court. However, separate confinement orders will
be necessary for the two separate statutes [sic] of the patient
(even though both confinements might be in the same hospital
and even though the patient might not have left the hospital)
and will be issued by the superintendent after receiving the order
of commitment from the court." 8
The second question raised by the data collected is: Would a full and
fair hearing be effective ?1o7 Of a total of 397 cases, the authors were able
to record only eight instances in which the court deviated from the
position taken by the district state hospital. In three of these, the court
did not adjudge a person a sexual psychopath despite a hospital finding
of such psychopathy."' In the 249 commitments of adjudged sexual
psychopaths since the 1959 amendments, only five persons were so
adjudged against the recommendation of the state hospital. In four of
those cases the defendant was committed despite a negative finding by
the hospital; a violation of the statutory provisions.' In the fifth, the
defendant was diagnosed as a sexual psychopath and legally commitable,
104. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3404(d) (Burns Supp. 1967). That the statute does not
require a second hearing may serve to invalidate many current commitments. See
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), and Note, supra note 12, at 255-58.
105. Note, supra note 12, at 257 n.92.
106. Official Bulletins, V-5.04.F1.
107. For similar doubts concerning the initial hearing see text at notes 89-95 supra.
108. Cases 399, 464, 599. Two of the three cases contained special circumstances
which might account for the variance. The first had serious procedural irregularities
(399) and the second involved a twenty-four year old black defendant charged with the
armed rape of a twenty year old white girl. (599).
There were three other cases in which a second commitment order was not issued
despite a recommendation by the state hospital; two of these were based on the judge's
belief that no second order was necessary (Cases 604, 616) ; the third involved the case
of a man who had never been discharged from a 1951 sexual psychopathy commitment
and was, therefore, still under a final commitment (Case 290).
109. Cases 228, 268, 280, 403.
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but the hospital staff recommended that the defendant be sent to jail. The
judge simply disregarded the recommendation."' In another case a
second order was issued against the hospital's finding of no sexual
psychopathy, but the judge withdrew the order when the illegality of that
action was brought to his attention by hospital officials.'11 Because the
court followed the finding and recommendations of the state hospital in
ninety-eight per cent of all cases, the efficacy of due process protections at
this second hearing as well as at the first is in doubt.
Who Becomes a Sexual Psychopath?
Thus far, this article has concentrated on the processes leading to a
commitment as a probable and/or adjudged sexual psychopath. In order
to appreciate the impact of this statute, one must look at the individuals
who fall under its provisions. The composite obtained is of a white male,
under the age of forty and married at least once.
Of 396 persons found to be probable sexual psychopaths since 1959,
only twenty-eight (7.1 per cent) are black. This figure is slightly higher
than the less than five per cent reported during the first seven years of the
act's operation by Cohen, although it is still below statistical expecta-
tions."' Commitments of blacks are evenly distributed over the years
1961 through 1968.
Only four women, one of whom was black, have been found to be
probable sexual psychopaths during the last ten years. The cases of the
four women, two of whom were adjudged sexual psychopaths, do not
differ in any respect from the bulk of the cases. The last woman to be
committed was committed in 1962.
Table 4 presents an age distribution of offenders in cases 226 to 621.
The distribution is quite consistent with that obtained by Cohen for cases
1 to 160 (See Table 5). Table 6 represents the marital status of offenders
226 to 621, showing that less than one-third had never married. This
figure varies from Cohen's results in cases 1-160, but the difference is not
siguificant."' These general statistical similarities indicate that the average
person adjudged a sexual psychopath under the 1949 act is of the same
type found to be a probable sexual psychopath under the 1959 amend-
ments.
110. Case 605. In at least twelve other cases similar recommendations by the
district state hospital were followed.
111. Case 236.
112. Cohen, at 456.
113. Id., at 456, Table 4.
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Marital Status of Offenders (No. 226-621)
Adjudged Not Adjudged
Sexual Psychopaths Sexual Psychopaths
86 (35%) 40 (27%)
111 (45%) 66 (45%)
6 (2%) 4 (3%)
33 (13%) 23 (15%)
3 (1%) 4 (3%)
10 (4%) 11 (7%)
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A further indication of the consistency in the use of the statute can be
found in Tables 7, 8, and 9, which show the diagnostic groupings of
probable sexual psychopaths and adjudged sexual psychopaths, and com-
pare the diagnostic groupings of the offenders in cases 1-160 to those
in cases 226-621. Because of a confusing array of terms used in the
medical reports and because of multiple diagnoses in many cases, these
tables are broken into the gross psychiatric categories which correspond
to the provisions of the statute: mentally disordered (Neurotic Reactions
and Personality Disorders), but neither insane (Psychotic) nor feeble-
minded (Feebleminded). Two additional columns provide for offenders
who were not suffering from a mental disorder (No Mental Illness) and
those for whom no clear diagnosis could be obtained from the file
(Unknown).
As expected, over seventy-five per cent of all offenders diagnosed as
psychotic (forty-eight of sixty-three) appear in Table 7. Only four of the
fifteen psychotics found in Table 8 represent cases in which the district
state hospital found the defendant not to be a sexual psychopath. 14 The
remaining eleven, while not meeting the statutory requirements, were
found by the hospital to be sexual psychopaths because they were not
grossly psychotic and were considered, for other factors, to be good
treatment risks.
As expected, over seventy-seven per cent of all offenders diagnosed
as suffering from a neurotic reaction or personality disorder (212 of 272)
appear as adjudged sexual psychopaths in Table 8. Of the sixty similarly
diagnosed individuals who were found by the court not to be sexual
psychopaths only three were diagnosed and recommended for commitment
Table 7
Diagnostic Groupings of Not Adjudged Sexual Psychopaths
No
Neurotic Reactions & Psychotic Mental
Character Disorders Disorders Feebleminded Illness Unknown
1959 4 1
1960 5 10 3 1
1961 6 6 5
1962 7 7 3 2
1963 6 6 3 1
1964 4 7 1 1 2
1965 10 5 1 3
1966 2 3 1 1 3
1967 7 2 1 4
114. See text at note 109 supra.
SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH
Total
* All columns rounded off.
Table 8
Diagnostic Groupings of Adjudged Sexual Psychopaths
Neurotic Reactions & Psychotic






*All columns rounded off except "No Mental Illness."
'One individual is included in 2 yearly figures.
Table 9
Diagnostic Groupings of Offenders
Cohen
Cases 1 - 160
Neurotic Reactions
& Character Disorders 123 (77%)
Psychotic Disorders 24 (15%)
Feebleminded 9 (6%)
No Mental Illness 4 (2%)
Unknown
TOTAL 160 (100%)
*All columns rounded off except "No Mental Illness."
'One individual counted twice.
Granucci & Granucci







as sexual psychopaths by the hospital." 5 The remaining fifty-seven were
either found not to have a propensity for future sex crimes or, although
technically sexual psychopaths, the hospital recommended against com-
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mitment on grounds that the individual might be innocent of the criminal
charge or that he would make a poor treatment risk.
Table 9 shows the combined diagnostic groupings of offenders in
cases 1-160 and cases 226 to 621. Here, too, the comparison between
groups is remarkable.
One factor which has not remained constant, however, is the source,
by counties, of the offenders committed. In his 1957 study, Elias Cohen
noted discrepancies between the relative populations of counties and the
number of persons they committed.'16 For example, Elkhart County, with
a population less than one-quarter that of Lake County, committed an
equal number of persons during the years 1949 to 1956. He further noted
that the seven largest counties with more than forty per cent of the state's
population contributed only thirty per cent of all commitments. Table 10
presents a breakdown by counties of cases 1-160 and cases 226-621.
Remarkable changes in distribution can be noted. During the past ten
years, Lake County has committed almost five times the number of persons
committed from Elkhart County, while their populations have remained
in about the same proportion to one another. The seven counties referred
to by Cohen have accounted for 207 commitments over the past ten years,
over fifty-two per cent of the total, a twenty-two per cent increase in the
proportion of their share of the 1949-1956 commitments.
Cohen's figures are more limited in scope than those currently
Table 10
DISTRIBUTION OF COMMITMENTS BY COUNTY
Granucci & Granucci Cohen
Cases No. 226- 621 Cases No. 1 - 160
Not
Adjudged Adjudged Pop. in
County S.P. S.P. Total Total Thousands*
Adams 1 1 3 25
Allen 18 10 28 6 232
Bartholomew 4 1 5 3 48
Benton 12
Blackford 1 6 7 2 15
Boone 2 2 1 28
Brown 7
Carroll 2 17
Cass 1 1 41
Clark 2 63
Clay 24
Clinton 1 3 4 1 31
Crawford 1 1 8
Daviess 1 1 1 27
116. Cohen, at 458-60 n.11.
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Not
Adjudged Adjudged Pop. in
County S.P. S.P. Total Total Thousands*
Dearborn 1 1 29
Decatur 1 1 2 20
DeKalb 1 28
Delaware 8 3 11 1 111
Dubois 2 2 27
Elkhart 13 9 22 13 107
Fayette 1 1 1 24
Floyd 2 51
Fountain 1 1 2 1 19
Franklin 1 17
Fulton 3 1 4 17
Gibson 1 1 30
Grant 2 76
Greene 26
Hamilton 5 5 2 40
Hancock 27
Harrison 3 3 19
Hendricks 3 41
Henry 1 1 2 1 49
Howard 6 3 9 3 70
Huntington 2 1 3 34
Jackson 6 31
Jasper 1 2 3 1 19
Jay 1 23
Jefferson 2 2 24
Jennings 17
Johnson 1 44
Knox 4 4 5 42
Kosciusko 1 1 40
LaGrange 3 2 5 17
Lake 71 35 106 13 513
LaPorte 8 7 15 5 95
Lawrence 1 1 1 37
Madison 1 4 5 3 126
Marion 51 3 54 21 698
Marshall 1 1 32
Martin 11
Miami 1 1 8 38
Monroe 1 2 3 59
Montgomery 2 1 3 4 32
Morgan 2 4 6 1 34
Newton 12
Noble 2 1 3 28
Ohio 4
Orange 1 17
Owen 1 1 11
Parke 15
Perry 3 3 17
Pike 13
Porter 7 3 10 5 60
Posey 1 19
Pulaski 1 1 1 13
Putnam 25
Randolph 1 1 2 28
Ripley 1 2 3 3 21


























* Rounded to nearest 1,000.
Total
148 397 160
Source: Indiana Almanac, 37-38 (1967).
available because he could only work with adjudged sexual psychopaths.
Cases 226-621 can be broken into those who were and were not ultimately
adjudged sexual psychopaths. When this is done, additional differences
between counties can be noted. Marion County found fifty-four persons
to be probable sexual psychopaths and fifty-one of those were ultimately
adjudged sexual psychopaths. This ninety-five per cent adjudication rate
can be contrasted with Lake County where only seventy-one out of
106, less than seventy per cent, ultimately were adjudged sexual
psychopaths. Knox County, which had committed five sexual psychopaths
during 1949-1956, has failed in four attempts since 1959 to obtain an
indefinite commitment.
What significance these difference have, if any, is elusive. The
vagaries of chance play a role in placing offenders into the process. The
remaining differences must be attributed to the personalities at all levels
who have a hand in the act's operation. In one county for example a local
judge has held the act unconstitutional, and the local prosecutor has
abandoned efforts for further commitments. n7 One prosecutor reported
disillusionment with the statute because of a case in which an early release
from the Department of Mental Health resulted in recidivism." 8 Each
117. Questionnaire received from M. Dale Palmer, Esq.






























county has its own history, each has its own personalities, and each has
undergone personnel changes during the twenty year span covered by the
available data.
Of the data available on sexual psychopaths, the single most import-
ant item is the nature of the offenses with which they are charged. By
looking at the catch, one can learn about both the fishermen and the
quality of their net. Sexual psychopath statutes should aim for offenders
whose acts are deviant in either or both of two important respects, the
use of violence by the offender and crimes in which there is a significant
age disparity between a mature offender and an immature victim.119 Table
11 categorizes those adjudged sexual psychopaths and those not so
adjudged into five offender types. These categories, which are modified
from those developed by Indiana University's Sex Research Insitute,
1 -0
illustrate the criteria for violence and disparity in age.
Aggressive Offenders v. Adults includes persons charged with non-
consensual offenses, such as rapes and assaults with intent to rape, in
which the victim is over seventeen years of age. Heterosexual Offenders
v. Children includes persons charged with any offense in which the victim
is under eighteen years of age and of the opposite sex from the offender.
Homosexual Offenders v. Children includes persons charged with any
offense in which the victim was under eighteen years of age and was of the
same sex as the offender. These two categories include persons charged
with various forms of child molesting ranging from minor forms of
physical contact (touching) to sexual intercourse. All such offenses are
considered non-consensual because of actual physical violence or because of
the immaturity of the victim. Offenders v. M\Iorality includes persons
charged with offenses without victims..' (e.g., acts of homosexuality
between consenting adults). This is the only category which does not
include either a possibility of violence or disparity of age between offender
and victim. In all categories the offenders are male unless otherwise noted.





Psychopaths Psychopaths TOTAL %
Aggressive Offenders
v. Adults (Age 18 and over) 251 141 39 9.7
119. Cohen, at 450.
120. P. GEBHARD, J. GAGNON, W. POMEROY, C. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS 11
(1965). [Hereinafter cited as Sax OFFENDmS].
121. See generally E. ScHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS (1965).
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Heterosexual Offenders
v. Children
Age 1- 7 20 12 32
8- 12 44 12 56
13- 17 21 142 35
Total 85 38 123 30.9
Homosexual Offenders
v. Children
Age 1- 7 7 4 11
8- 12 153 12 27
13- 17 33 10 43
Total 55 26 81 20.6
Incest Offenders
v. Children
Age 1- 7 7 84 15
8- 12 204 9 29
13- 17 23 12 35
Total 50 29 79 19.8
Offenders v. Morality
Exhibitionists 16 14 30
Adult Homosexual 10 5 15
Others 3 4 7
Total 29 23 52 13.0
Not Sex Related 1 1 2 0.5
Unknown 5 17 22 5.5
TOTALS 250* 148 398* 100.0
*One adjudged sexual psychopath fell into two groups.
1Includes two incest offenders against daughters over 18.
-Includes two female offenders against males.
3Includes two female offenders against females.
41ncludes two male offenders against males (son and nephew).
offenders who were not adjudged sexual psychopaths. A brief review of
each column indicates that, with the possible exception of Offenders v.
Morality, there is no correlation between the type of offender and his
status as a sexual psychopath or not a sexual psychopath. The Depart-
ment of Mental Health, therefore, is not differentiating sexual psychopaths
from non-sexual psychopaths on the basis of the offense charged. Over
seventy-five per cent of the twenty-two unknown cases in Table 11 fall
into the not sexual psychopath column. The reason for this is that there
is less information in the files on cases which do not result in an indefinite
commitment.
SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH
Over seventy-one per cent of the cases since 1959 fall into the
Offender v. Children categories. This is a significant increase over the
forty per cent reported by Cohen for cases to 1957122 and is similar to
findings in California where over sixty per cent of sexual psychopaths
had offended against children.'23 Of the 398 cases studied 123 (thirty
per cent) were Heterosexual Offenders v. Children, a remarkable cor-
respondence to the California study where of 207 cases, sixty-three
(thirty per cent) were in this category." 4 Over three-quarters of the
victims of this group in Table 11 were females under the age of twelve.
The percentage of violent offenders in Table 11 is 9.7, a marked
decrease from the seventeen per cent in this category in Cohen's study."2 5
Again, Indiana figures since 1959 correspond closely with results in
California where only twenty-one of 207 sexual psychopaths (less than
ten per cent) were Aggressive Offenders v. Adults.'26 The Indiana figure
does not hold true for black offenders, however, over thirty-five per cent
of whom fell into this category.
The foregoing indicates that since 1959 eighty-one per cent of all
cases in which the sexual psychopath statute has been used involved
violence or children. The fear that this statute might be used to enforce
disputed sexual mores has not been borne out. Only thirteen per cent of
all cases involve Offenders v. Morality, a decrease from the sixteen to
thirty-three percent reported by Cohen.' Also significant is that this
category had the highest percentage of not sexual psychopaths. Of the 250
adjudged sexual psychopaths, only 11.6 per cent were Offenders v.
Morality and only ten of the 250 (2.5 per cent) were consenting adult
homosexuals. Although the California study does not categorize Offender
v. Morality per se, exhibitionists (who comprise only a portion of this
category) account for fifteen per cent of the adjudged sexual psychopaths
in the California report. 2 ' It is obvious from these figures that Indiana
committed fewer offenders who fall into this category, for the thirteen
per cent includes exhibitionists, adult homosexuals, and others.
The conclusion drawn is that the sexual psychopath statute has not
been used to incarcerate nuisance offenders, but has been focused on those
who are violent or offend against children. Since the 1959 amendments,
even fewer nuisance offenders have been proceeded against and fewer have
been adjudged sexual psychopaths. In this regard, Indiana's experience
122. Cohen, at 454.
123. SEX OmN FRs 848-49.
124. Id.
125. Cohen, at 453, 454.
126. SEx OFFENDERs 849.
127. Cohen, at 454.
128. SEX OFFENDERS 849.
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compares favorably with results obtained under a similar statute in
California.
Table 12 presents the number of persons admitted to each district
state hospital for observation each year. Separate listing is made of those
Table 12
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Total Number of Cases: 146'
GRAND
TOTAL 209 53 48 39 30 14




who were subsequently adjudged sexual psychopaths and those who
were not. Significant differences between hospitals can be noted in the per-
centage of initial admittees for observation who ultimately were adjudged
sexual psychopaths. Central State Hospital had virtually all of its original
observatees later adjudged sexual psychopaths, whereas not one of Evans-
ville State Hospital's fourteen observation patients later became an ad-
judged sexual psychopath. These differences correspond to the differences
among counties in proportion of observations later adjudged sexual
psychopaths. The possible explanations mentioned for those differences
are applicable here as well.'*29
Table 13 presents the current status of the 249 adjudged sexual
psychopaths as of March 1,. 1969. The data is accurate only in so far as
their status was accurately reflected in the central files of the Department
of Mental Health. Those shown as hospitalized constitute 34.1 per cent
of all adjudged sexual psychopath commitments since 1959. The majority
of those still hospitalized (fifty-one out of eighty-five) were committed
within the last three years. Not all of the eighty-five are physically
within a district state hospital. Many are free on some form of limited
parole.
Table 13 indicates that forty-eight persons (19.3 per cent) are
currently on escape status. This figure does not include eighteen persons
who have been absent without permission from the hospital but subse-
quently were returned. This combined total of sixty-six persons is higher
than the number of discharges granted within the same period. The
whereabouts of most of the escapees is unknown, although several are
currently serving prison sentences in Indiana and other states.
Table 13
CURRENT STATUS OF ADJUDGED SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS*
Year Hospitalized Discharged Paroled Escaped Dead Totals
1959 1 (10%) 5 (50%) 2 (20%) 2 (20%) 10 (100%)
1960 3 (17%) 9 (50%) 4 (22%) 1 (5.5%) 1 (5.5%) 18 (100%)
1961 8 (29%) 8 (29%) 5 (18%) 6 (21%) 1 (3.0%) 28 (100%)
1962 1 (3%) 11 (36%) 10 (32%) 9 (29%) 31 (100%)
1963 5 (20%) 9 (36%) 5 (20%) 5 (20%) 1 (4.0%) 25 (100%)
1964 7 (23%) 4 (13%) 14 (47%) 5 (17%) 30 (100%)
1965 9 (24%) 5 (14%) 16 (43%) 7 (19%) 37 (100%)
1966 27 (77%) 2 (6%) 6 (17%) 35 (100%)
1967 15 (62.5%) 3 (12.5%) 5 (21%) 1 (4.0%) 24 (100%)
1968 9 (82%) 2 (18%) 11 (100%)
Total
All
Years 85 (34.1%) 51 (20.5%) 61 (24.5%) 48 (19.3%) 4 (1.6%) 249 (100%)
* As of 1 March 1969.
129. See text at notes 117-18 supra.
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Parole
Table 13 shows that as of March 1, 1969 there were sixty-one persons
on an indefinite parole status. The sexual psychopath statute grants to
the Commissioner of Mental Health power to parole adjudged sexual
psychopaths without court authorization."' The superintendent of each
district state hospital and his staff have the responsibility to initiate
parole plans and to forward them to the Commissioner for approval.'
The Commissioner's office usually requires a showing of medical justi-
fication from the superintendent along with an appropriate parole plan
including community sponsor and job.
There are three types of parole, short limited paroles (visits),
limited paroles of up to one year, and indefinite paroles."3 The indefinite
parole is used in Tables 13 and 14 since it reflects an administrative
decision to end hospitalization (if a person remains without incident on
indefinite parole he will normally be eligible for a discharge) and is
always approved by the central office.
During the last ten years, 112 persons have been released on inde-
finite parole of which seventeen were returned to the hospital as parole
violators and six went on escape status when they failed to report to the
hospital for a periodic visit. Of the seventeen returned to the hospital, ten
are currently on indefinite parole status again, and seven remain in the
hospital or on limited parole.
A critical factor in the operation of the sexual psychopath act is the
amount of time adjudged sexual psychopaths remain in custody. For the
112 parolees the average time spent from the date of their adjudgment as
sexual psychopaths to their first indefinite parole was 664 days (one year
and ten months). The figure rises to 734 days (two years and four dayi)
when calculated from the date of the sexual psychopath's initial hospital
admission. Table 14 shows the distribution, in length of time, of these
paroles by hospital of admission. One-half of the paroles were granted in
the first eighteen months of hospitalization, twenty-eight per cent in the
first year. This compares favorably with similar statistics compiled by
Cohen, who found that twenty-five out of 103 paroles (over twenty-four
per cent) were granted during the first year."'
130. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3407 (Burns 1956 Repl.). The statute refers to the
Indiana Council for Mental Health, whose functions are now vested with the Com-
missioner of Mental Health. IND. A N. STAT. § 22-5007 (Burns 1964 Repl.).
131. Official Bulletins, V-5.06 B2.
132. Official Bulletins, V-5.06 B.
133. Cohen, at 464. Cohen's dates are computed from hospital admission, because
there was no observational period in cases 1-160. However, Cohen does not state whether
he includes limited paroles in his figures.
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The foregoing figures for average time to parole are underestima-
tions for they do not take into account persons who have been hospitalized
over the average time and yet who still have not been paroled. As of
March 1, 1969, forty-five adjudged sexual psychopaths fell into this
category'1
4
Although Cohen could not find any correlation between discharges
and the offenses charged,"'a certain patterns do emerge in the parole
structure. Of the thirty-three adjudged sexual psychopaths who were
granted indefinite parole in less than one year, none were Aggressive
Offenders v. Adults which comprise almost ten per cent of the total
commitments. One group of offenders, Offenders v. Morality, received
forty per cent of all paroles granted within one year. In addition, seven
out of ten consenting adult homosexuals received such paroles. It would
appear, therefore, that hospital paroles are granted to less serious offenders
first. The fact that seventy per cent of all adult consenting homosexuals
received early paroles further strengthens the impression that the statute
does not, in practice, serve as a vehicle to oppress Offenders v. Morality.
Discharges
Information upon which to make conclusions about the operation of
the discharge provision of the sexual psychopath statute is not available.
The files of the Department of Mental Health do not always indicate if a
discharge has occurred. Even when a discharge is noted, the grounds for
discharge, medical or legal, are often not recorded. Therefore, Cohen's
conclusion that the courts are more willing to grant discharges than the
hospitals were willing to grant paroles cannot be confirmed.'
Of fifty-one recorded discharges, only twelve (twenty-four per cent)
were ordered directly from the hospital without a prior period spent on
indefinite parole. This is in contrast to Cohen's finding that forty-four
per cent of all discharges prior to 1957 were direct from the hospital. 7
The average time from adjudgment as a sexual psychopath to such a
discharge was 1514 days (four years and two months). This figure is
higher by 619 days (one year and eight months) than the average time
for the thirty-nine discharges granted from indefinite parole. Any attempt
to draw conclusions from this data would be fool-hardy for several
134. Of these forty-five, at least eleven have been released on limited parole. All
persons receiving indefinite paroles had been released from the hospital on limited
parole for at least three months.
135. Cohen, at 465.
136. Id., at 465. Cohen appears to have failed to recognize that many persons
released directly from the hospital need not have "fully and permanently" recovered if
their commitments were invalid.
137. Id., at 464.
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reasons. First, the process of discharge leaves many adjudged sexual
psychopaths on indefinite parole long after they were eligible for and
could likely have received their final discharge. A petition for discharge
must be filed with the court by the adjudged sexual psychopath or some-
one in his behalf. The authors noted several cases in which the hospital
had no objection to discharge yet no discharge had yet been obtained
because of the sexual psychopath's lack of funds to conduct such a
proceeding or his reluctance to go through the publicity of a discharge
proceeding. That such sexual psychopaths have not been discharged does
not reflect on either the willingness of the hospital to support discharge
petitions, or on the willingness of the court to grant such petitions. A
means by which these cases could be closed from court and hospital rolls
would serve administrative and human needs. 3 '
Connmitinents Not in Conformance with Statutory Provisions
Of 397 commitments of probable sexual psychopaths studied, sixty-
eight (over seventeen per cent) were not in conformance with statutory
provisions. This figure reflects instances of conscious disregard for the
act's provisions, attempts to circumvent statutory limitations for the
benefit of a given defendant, and the ignorance of the bar about the pro-
cesses which lead to a sexual psychopath commitment.
Failures to follow statutory norms fall into several categories. The
largest included forty-one cases in which examining physicians' reports
were unwritten, missing, or found a defendant not to be a sexual psycho-
path. Of these forty-one, however, only nine were ultimately adjudged
sexual psychopaths. There were five instances in which a court adjudged
a person a sexual psychopath despite a finding by the district state hospital
that he was not within the statutory provisions. 9 Eight cases appeared to
be outside the scope of the statute altogether. In five of those, rape of a
female child under the age of twelve had been committed. 4 ' The rape
charges were amended by prosecutors to assault with intent to rape,
assault with intent to gratify, and incest; commitments followed. Of the
three remaining, one person was under the age of sixteen,' 4 ' and two cases
did not show any relationship to a sexual aberrance.
42
The remainder of the failures to follow statutory norms were all
unique, ranging from committing a man without holding any previous
138. The statutory provision is broad enough to allow for discharge proceedings
initiated on the court's own motion. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3408 (Burns 1956 Repl.).
139. See text at notes 109, 111 supra.
140. Cases 342, 520, 538, 539, 580.
141. Case 354.
142. Cases 433 (theft), 604 (auto banditry). The lack of a sexual motive may be
a failing of the files. In Case 516 a charge of burglary involved a theft of fetish objects.
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proceedings..3 to committing a man a second time when the first observa-
tion was negative.144 In one instance both a judge and a court clerk, in
order to disguise the fact that an observational commitment had run over
sixty days, falsified court records to read as if the final adjudgment order
had been signed two months earlier.'45
Some of the above described cases might not be found illegal if put
to a court test. Prosecutors do have discretion to charge any of several
offenses which the facts might warrant, and waivers by defendants who
were petitioning may have cured what appear to be statutory defects. It
is clear, however, that each case violates the spirit of the act as written
and amended by the legislature. Even if one agrees with a judge's
opinion that "this is a poorly written law, '1. 6 this should not be grounds
for such a high number of cases ignoring its provisions.
Conclusion
Despite failures on the part of the bar and certain administrative
delays, the sexual psychopath act is functioning quite well in two of three
major respects. First, the statute is being used to detain violent offenders
and offenders against children, and is not being used as a vehicle to
incarcerate less serious offenders. Second, those who are committed are,
on the whole, being treated and released with dispatch. The third question,
whether or not the sexual psychopath statute prevents recidivism, remains
unanswered.
This picture will not remain static. Differences in operation have
been noted between 1949-1957 and 1959-1968. Because of the wide
discretion granted to many different persons in the administration of the
sexual psychopath statute and because policies on parole and discharge
can change overnight with changes in relevant personnel, cofistant mon-


















Volume 44 Summer 1969 Number 4









A. ENNIS DALE GERALD F. GEORGE

















CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
F. REED DICKmSON: A.B. 1931, Williams College; LL.B. 1934, Harvard Univ.;
LL.M. 1939, J.S.D. 1950, Columbia Univ.; Professor of Law, Indiana Univ.
ANTHONY GRANUCCI: B.A. 1965, Univ. of Calif.; J.D. 1968, Harvard Univ.;
Teaching Associate, Indiana Univ.
SUSAN JAmART GRANUCCI: A.A. 1963, Foothill College. Research Associate, Ind-
iana Univ.
Luis KUTNER: B.A. 1930, Univ. of Chicago; LL.B. John Marshall Law School.
Member of Illinois and Indiana Bars. Chairman, World Habeas Corpus Committee,
World Peace Through Law Center; Former Consul, Ecuador; former Consul General,
Guatemala.
WILLIAM W. OLIVER: B.A. 1946, Univ. of Kentucky; J.D. 1949, Northwestern
Univ.; Professor of Law, Indiana University.
RONALD L. STYN: B.A. 1963, Univ. of Redlands; LL.B. 1965, Stanford Univ.;
Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Kentucky.
Copyright @ 1969 by the Trustees of Indiana University.
